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The 11 Decl i ne .. of U.S. Manufacturing: 
Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
and Michael J. Athey 
Introduction 
Are America's basic industries, pressured by overwhelming import 
competition, becoming an anachronistic 11 rust belt11 ? Must government step in 
to assure the survival of older, heavy industries, especially in the Midwest? 
Are we becoming a service economy focusing on information, hamburgers, and 
dress shops? 
As is so frequently the case, the facts available to answer these 
questions are undramatic, not supportive of any extreme position, and thus 
uncompetitive in the marketplace for public policy viewpoints. The truth of 
the matter is that some of this nation's heavy industries are no longer 
competitive and are in the process of shrinking in size and importance; steel 
and automobile companies have reported the most dramatic cutbacks. Yet, on 
balance, the answer to each of the questions is a clear 11 n0. 11 If the U.S. 
manufacturing sector is declining, it is far more a matter of perception than 
rea 1 i ty. 
The authors are Director of the Center for the Study of American Business and 
John M. Olin Fellow at the Center. They are indebted to Kenneth Chilton and 
Fredric Raines for comments on earlier drafts and for helpful suggestions. A 
summary of this working paper has been published in Industrial Policy Debate, 
Chalmers Johnson, editor (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984). 
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Highlights of the Analysis 
By and large, American manufacturing companies -- producers of hard goods 
and soft goods alike -- are holding their own while adjusting to the business 
cycle. As can be readily seen in Figure 1, both durable and nondurable 
manufacturing sectors in the United States have recovered from the 1981-82 
recession. In fact, by December 1983, total industrial production had 
attained an all time peak, and it continued to rise in the early months of 
1984. 
In view of these facts, how do we account for all of the gloom-and-doom 
talk about the sad prospects for U.S. manufacturing industries? First of all, 
the casual observer tends to generalize from a few highly-publicized instances 
of true distress. Moreover, the positive side of economic events is rarely 
considered newsworthy and thus escapes widespread public attention. 
But, perhaps most important, the authors of the new gospel of industrial 
policy -- as well as other 11 megatrend 11 thinkers -- have fallen into one of the 
oldest analytical traps. They have drawn heroic and long-term conclusions 
from the most recent data that they have seen. Many of the doom-and-gloom 
soothsayers were doing their writing in 1981 or 1982 when the economY was 
declining and, in a simpleminded fashion, they merely extrapolated that 
decline into the future. Such action is on par with reacting to the 
spring rains by rebuilding Noah•s ark. 
To treat the downside of a business cycle as a fundamental and lasting 
new development is, of course, as silly as reacting with euphoria to news of 
the upturn. It is intriguing to note that some observers at the conservative 
end of the political spectrum are beginning to do just that. Predicting a 
runaway boom in the 1980s, however, is as misleading as the counsel of 
despair, because it sets up unattainable expectations. 
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Figure 1 
TREND OF U.S. MANUFACTURING OUTPUT 
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Source: Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release G.12.3, 
11 Industrial Production, 11 March 15, 1984. 
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To begin the analysis, it is useful to examine the trend of output in key 
sectors of the American economY. As shown in Table 1, total durable goods 
production dropped 11 percent from 1981 to 1982. Smaller declines occurred in 
the broader aggregates, such as all manufacturing and total industrial 
production. All three aggregate measures, however, remained substantially 
above the levels of the 1970s. The point being made here is not to 
underestimate the severity of the recent recession. Rather, it is to perceive 
the underlying strength of the American economy. 
When we disaggregate further and examine individual industry groups, we 
find -- as would be expected -- a more diverse pattern of movement. For 
example, primary metals (including steel) took a bad tumble, declining by 31 
percent between 1981 and 1982. In contrast, transportation equipment (a 
category covering both automotive and aerospace production) was down by 9 
percent and instrument producers (a heavily defense-oriented sector) reported 
a 5 percent drop in production. 
Of greater interest is the nature of the snapback in 1983. Two industry 
groups exceeded their 1981 highs -- electrical machinery and transportation 
equipment. At the other end of the spectrum of performance, the 1983 recovery 
in primary metals (up 13 percent) did not bring that industry back to its 1975 
level of output. Nevertheless, taking full account of the variations among 
industries, it seems clear that the decline in heavy manufacturing industries 
that was so noticeable in 1982 did not represent a new and durable long-term 
trend. Rather, the decline was primarily the result of a severe but 
short-term cyclical contraction. 
There are serious problems facing American industry. Many individual 
companies-- in high-tech as well as low-tech industries-- have not learned 
how to control their costs satisfactorily. Yet simultaneously, there are 
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Table 1 
PRODUCTION INDEX FOR SELECTED DURABLE GOODS 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(1967 = 100) 
Industry Group 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Primary metals 107 96 102 108 75 
Fabricated metal products 102 110 134 136 115 
Electrical machinery 108 117 173 178 169 
Nonelectrical machinery 104 125 163 171 149 
Transportation equipment 90 97 117 116 105 
Instruments 112 132 171 170 162 
Total Durable Goods 102 109 137 141 125 
All Manufacturing 106 116 147 150 138 
Total Industrial Production 108 118 147 151 139 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
Dec. Feb. 
1983 1983 1984 
85 90 98 
120 129 133 
186 201 211 
151 164 169 
118 131 136 
159 165 169 
135 145 150 
148 157 162 
148 156 160 
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numerous firms -- in both new and traditional fields -- that are succeeding in 
raising productivity and keeping expenses in check. Those businesses that so 
improve their competitiveness are maintaining or even enhancing their market 
positions, domestically and internationally. 
This report focuses on output as the prime indicator of the economic 
performance of business firms. Yet we must acknowledge the great amount of 
interest in employment trends. After all, it is the high levels of 
unemployment that often exacerbate pressures for restricting imports and for 
providing federal bailouts of domestic corporations. However, public 
discussions rarely acknowledge the relationship between production, job 
creation, and productivity. That is, in an economy with rising productivity 
(technically, output per worker hour), we would expect that employment rises 
more slowly than does output. In fact, instances of slowly growing or stable 
output might be accompanied by declining employment. That is, declining 
employment does not automatically and inevitably imply declining production. 
And the health of an industry is determined not by its demand for inputs 
(labor, capital, etc.), but by its supply of output-- by its contribution of 
goods and services to the society•s standard of living. 
Thus, if there is a social responsibility of companies, it is to supply 
consumer•s wants, the generation of employment being an important by-product. 
Because of the interest in the subject of employment (and the related question 
of unemployment), it is useful to examine Table 2, which contains data on 
employment for selected years since 1970. It can be seen that total 
manufacturing employment in the United States has fluctuated in the range of 
18 to 20 million during this period, and that the performance in 1982, 
although low, was merely at the bottom end of the range. It is interesting to 
Industry Group 
Primary meta 1 s 
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Table 2 
EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED DURABLE GOODS 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(thousands of employees) 
1970 1975 1980 1981 
1,260 1,139 1,142 1,121 
Fabricated meta 1 products 1,560 1,458 1,613 1,592 
Electrical machinery 1,871 1,702 2,091 2,092 
Nonelectrical machinery 1,984 2,057 1,494 2,507 
Transportation equipment 1,853 1,715 1,900 1,893 
Instruments 527 550 711 727 
Total Durable Goods 11,208 10,688 12,187 12,117 
All Manufacturing 19,367 18,323 20,285 20,173 
aprel iminary 
Dec. 
1982 
816 
1,359 
1,957 
2,066 
1,696 
695 
10,559 
18,193 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various statistical releases. 
Dec. Feb. 
1983 1984a 
881 879 
1,449 1,466 
2,146 2,195 
2,172 2,202 
1,887 1,929 
701 709 
11,406 11,575 
19,280 19,495 
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note that the decline in employment in 1982 was followed, in every major hard-
goods sector, by an expansion in 1983. In most cases, that rise continued 
into the early months of 1984. As in the case of the production data, 
variations among and within industry groups are substantial. 
The above statistics clearly do not support a counsel of despair for U.S. 
manufacturing industries. Of course, neither should the data engender 
elation. The following section of this report examines these matters in more 
detai 1. 
Statistical Analysis of U.S. Manufacturing, 1948-1982 
The burst of concern about the decline of U.S. manufacturing has focused 
on the older, low-tech industries often referred to collectively as the .. rust 
belt ... Let us see what the facts are. 
The analysis presented in this section is based upon the twenty-one 
subsectors of manufacturing for which data are published in the National 
Income and Product Accounts. These industries are presented in Table A-1 of 
the Appendix along with their respective standard industrial classification 
(SIC) code.1 As can be seen, the categories correspond to the two-digit level 
of aggregation except for transportation equipment (SIC37), which is further 
divided into motor vehicles and equipment (SIC371) and other transportation 
equipment (SIC372-9). 
In order to aid in the analysis of the manufacturing sector, these 
industries are divided into two groups: high-tech and low-tech. The method 
used to make this division is to rank the industries by the percentage of the 
net sales devoted to research and development (R & D). The high-tech 
industries are those in which percentages exceed the average for all 
manufacturing in 1980. The low-tech sectors are those with below average 
percentages.2 
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Table 3 shows the results of this classification. Six of the 21 major 
sectors of U.S. manufacturing are classified as high-tech and the remaining 15 
as low-tech. There are a few surprises in this dichotomY. Motor vehicles 
and equipment show up as high-tech. Presumably, this reflects their 
substantial commitment of scientists and engineers to redesigning the 
contemporary automobile to meet the array of fuel economy, safety, and 
environmental requirements set by federal regulatory agencies. Also, 
petroleum (which is lumped with coal products) is assigned to the low-tech 
category. 
We now turn to the question, 11 Is the U.S. manufacturing sector in 
decline? .. To answer this, we examine the most comprehensive body of data 
available, the statistics on income produced by each of the twenty-one 
manufacturing industries presented in Table A-1.3 In order to determine 
whether a given industry has been growing or declining in terms of income 
produced, we fit the data to the following equation: 
where: 
Yit = ~iO + Si1 t + ~i2 CURt + Eit 
Yit = real income produced by industry i at time t 
t =year less 1948; 0 in 1948 
CURt= capacity utilization rate at time t 
Eit = random error term for industry i at time t 
Bi1 =the estimated trend for industry i. 
With this model the trend of an industry can be readily determined by 
( 1) 
estimating ~i1. If industry i is declining, ~i1 will be significantly less 
than zero (~i1 < 0), while if the industry is growing, ~i1 will be 
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Table 3 
CLASSIFICATION OF HIGH-TECH AND LOW-TECH 
INDUSTRIES IN 1980 
Industry 
R & D Funds as 
Percent of Net Sales 
High-Tech 
Other transportation equipment ••.•..•••••••••••••••••••••.•• 
Electric and electronic equipment ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Instruments and related products ••••••.••••••••••.•••••••••• 
Machinery, except electrical •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Motor vehicles and equipment •••.•••••..••.••••.••••••••••••. 
Chemicals and allied products •••••••••.••.•••••••••••••••••• 
All Manufacturing Average ••.•••••••.••.••••••••••••••••••.•.•• 
Low-Tech 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products .•••••••••••••••••• 
Stone, glass, and clay products ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Fabricated metal products •••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••.•••• 
Paper and allied products ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Printing and publishing J 
Leather and leather products •••••••••••..•••••••••••••••• 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Lumber and wood products]································· Furniture and fixtures 
Primary metals industries ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Petroleum and coal products •••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••• 
Textile mill products ]······················· Apparel and other textile products 
Food and kindred products •••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••• 
11.6* 
6.5 
6.0 
5.6 
5.0 
3.5 
3.1 
2.2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.4 
*Based on data for aircraft and missiles, which is the dominant industry in 
this category. 
Source: National Science Foundation, National Patterns of Science and 
Technology Resources 1982, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., March 1982. 
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significantly greater than zero {~il > 0). A stable industry, one with no 
growth trend over time, yields a coefficient which is not significantly 
different from zero {Ail ~ 0). 
Using this method,4 results were obtained for each industry for the 
period 1948-82 and are presented in Table 4. As can be seen, there is no 
statistical support for the claim that the low-tech industries are declining 
or even reaching a period of stagnation or stability. This type of analysis 
can be criticized, however, because an industry showing a growth trend at the 
beginning of the period could be declining toward the end and still show a 
positive trend overall. To deal with this possibility, we used the same 
methodology for a shorter, more recent period, 1970-82. 
The results for the 1970-82 period can be seen in Table 5. As in the 
case of Table 4, which covers the period 1948-82, there is no apparent support 
for the claim that the low-tech industries are declining. All of the 
high-tech industries show a positive trend except for motor vehicles and 
equipment which registers stability in this more recent period. None of the 
low-tech industries is measured as declining, and only leather and leather 
products along with primary metal industries have moved from the growth 
category to the stability category. Hence, neither the high-tech nor the 
low-tech industries show signs of decline in the later years of their 
respective time series. The potential statistical problem suggested above is 
thus not supported by the data. 
Why then do so many commentators contend that low-tech industries are 
declining? We suggest three possibilities: {1) they draw long-term 
conclusions from the data for the last few years, {2) they equate trends in 
employment in an industry with its overall health, or {3) they implicitly 
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Table 4 
TREND IN REAL NATIONAL INCOME BY INDUSTRY, 1948-1982 
Trend in 
Real Income High-tech industries 
Growth Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Other transportation 
equipment 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
Instruments and related 
products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Stability None 
Decline None 
Low-tech industries 
Lumber and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Primary metal industries 
Fabricated metal products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Food and kindred products 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Petroleum and coal products* 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Leather and leather products 
None 
None 
*In this and subsequent tables based on real income data, the results for 
petroleum and coal products are probably biased upward because the nondurable 
goods price deflator does not fully reflect the dramatic increase in the 
price of oil which took place in the 1970s. 
Note: The division between high-tech and low-tech industries in this table 
and the ones that follow are based upon the classification presented 
in Table 3. 
Sources: Tables A-12 and A-13. 
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Table 5 
TREND IN REAL NATIONAL INCOME BY INDUSTRY, 1970-1982 
Trend in 
Real Income High-tech industries 
Growth Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Other transportation 
equipment 
Instruments and related 
products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Stability Motor vehicles and equipment 
Decline None 
Sources: Tables A-14 and A-15. 
Low-tech industries 
Lumber and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Fabricated metal products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Food and kindred products 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Leather and leather products 
Primary metal industries 
None 
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define 11 declining 11 as growing more slowly than the rest of the economy. Each 
of these possibilities will be addressed in the following sections. 
The Business Cycle Rediscovered 
The period from 1970 to 1982 was a time of major economic disruptions. 
With supply shocks from the rapid rise in food exports and an oil embargo 
followed by a dramatic rise in oil prices, the U.S. economy was subjected to 
wide swings and deep recessions in 1973-75, 1980, and again in 1981-82. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the majority of two-digit manufacturing 
industries followed this same pattern. Focusing on both the low-tech and 
high-tech industries, one sees that during this time 14 out of the 21 
industries {67 percent) experienced their worst declines of the post-World 
War II period. This pattern is even more pronounced when only the low-tech 
industries are considered. In this case, 12 out of the 15 industries (80 
percent) suffered their most severe setback. Thus the recent period during 
which the proponents of an industrial policy for the U.S. have developed their 
arguments has contained several of the worst recessions experienced since 
World War II. It is not surprising that analysts focusing on one of these 
downturns have concluded that there has been a structural shift in the U.S. 
economy away from low-tech manufacturing industries. 
One must ask, however, whether or not it is proper to draw long-run 
conclusions from this unrepresentative sample period. We suggest that it is 
not. Focusing our attention on the period 1981-82, one sees that this 
recession was, at least for low-tech industries, worse than those which took 
place in the 1950s and 1960s, on a par with the recession of 1948-49, and less 
severe than that of 1973-75. This suggests that what we have been 
experiencing is not new. Rather, it is only another stage in the continuous 
process of change known as the business cycle. It is interesting that this 
15 
Table 6 
PERCENT CHANGES IN REAL NATIONAL INCOME BY INDUSTRY 
DURING EACH POST-WORLD WAR II BUSINESS CYCLE 
(From Peak to Trough) 
1948-49 1953-54 1957-58 1960-61 1969-70 1973-75 1981-82 
Low-Tech Industries 
Lumber and wood products -20.0 -7.8 -4.0 -4.6 -9.3 -29.4 -15.0 
Furniture and fixtures -7.9 -7.0 -10.8 -2.0 -9.3 -19.1 -5.6 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products -7.6 -1.8 -6.1 -2.0 -5.3 -16.3 -15.5 
Primary metal industries -14.2 -19.6 -22.5 -7.9 -6.8 -6.3 -37.9 
Fabricated meta 1 products -12.7 -9.9 -12.6 0.4 -9.7 -10.4 -10.6 
Miscellaneous manufacturing -13.8 -6.5 -5.7 4.5 -4.1 -8.0 -7.7 
Food and kindred products 0.7 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 15.2 -6.6 
Tobacco manufacturing 22.1 -1.2 6.7 -0.7 13.0 3.6 -3.6 
Text i 1 e mi 11 products -17.8 -13.4 -5.5 -3.2 -3.7 . -21.9 -12.1 
Apparel and other textile 
industries -1.8 -4.5 -1.5 1.5 -3.7 -15.8 -7.4 
Paper and allied products -4.3 2.6 -2.3 4.3 -4.7 -13.7 -10.4 
Printing and publishing 7.6 4.4 -2.6 1.9 -2.8 -10.6 -0.8 
Petroleum and coal products -19.1 0.1 -11.4 -5.8 4.8 33.8 -13.3 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products -5.0 -13.0 -5.5 3.5 -9.4 -21.3 -9.0 
Leather and leather products -8.1 -0.4 -7.2 -2.1 -6.2 -20.3 -5.3 
High-Tech Industries 
Machinery, except electrical -14.1 -11.9 -17.5 -0.4 -3.6 -5.5 -12.3 
Electric and electronic 
equipment -11.1 -11.4 -7.5 3.2 -6.7 -16.5 -3.3 
Other transportation equipment -4.3 -5.8 -6.2 6.1 -13.5 -8.3 1.4 
Motor vehicles and equipment 12.6 -17.8 -33.4 -12.0 -27.8 -31.2 -12.2 
Instruments and related 
products -7.6 -3.3 -3.6 0.0 -10.2 -6.6 1.4 
Chemicals and allied products 3.9 2.7 -3.5 4.5 -4.0 -2.5 -7.1 
Note: Figures may not correspond to those derived from the tables due to rounding. 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-5 and A-6. 
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volatility of manufacturing, especially in durable goods products, has been 
noted by students of the business cycle for more than half a century.5 Yet it 
appears that the existence of a business cycle has been overlooked by the 
proponents of an industrial policy. 
The point to be emphasized here is that our experience during the past 
decade has been typical of the economic swings associated with the business 
cycle. Of course, for most industries these swings have been severe. But, on 
reflection, when the economy goes through a recession it is not surprising to 
see a disproportionate decline in the manufacturing industries. The other 
side of the coin, however, is that in 1983 and early 1984 these same 
industries recovered from the recession more rapidly than the rest of the 
economy. Thus, current data do not support the gloom-and-doom prediction that 
the low-tech industries are on an irreversible decline. 
Is Employment the Problem? 
To many people, an upward trend in employment is a sign of a healthy and 
growing industry. In this study, it can be seen that five of the high-tech 
industries experienced growth in employment over the period 1948-82, with 
motor vehicles and equipment registering stability (see Table 7).6 Thus, 
there is some logic in taking the trend in job creation in those industries as 
a rough approximation for general growth. 
When the same analysis is made for the low-tech industries, we obtain 
results that indicate at first blush a group of declining industries. As can 
be seen in Table 7, five of the fifteen low-tech industries show declining 
trends in employment, while four others experience stability. Six low-tech 
industries, however, reflect a growth trend in employment over the period 
1948-82. 
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Table 7 
TREND IN EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, 1948-1982 
Trend in I 
Employment! High-tech industries 
Growth Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Other transportation 
equipment 
Instruments and related 
products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Stability I Motor vehicles and equipment 
Decline None 
Sources: Tables A-16 and A-17. 
Low-tech industries 
Furniture and fixtures 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Fabricated metal products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Primary metal industries 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Lumber and wood products 
Food and kindred products 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Leather and leather 
products 
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The question that must be addressed, however, is whether or not it is 
necessarily true that an industry which is reducing its labor force is truly a 
declining industry. This proposition -- which underlies so much of the 
popular writing on industrial policy -- does not necessarily hold. Surely an 
industry in which output is declining is also likely to be reducing 
employment. Yet, there are other reasons why employment may be decreasing. 
Referring back to Table 4, we recall that all the industries have been growing 
in terms of output. This means that those industries in Table 7 which are 
declining in terms of employment are at the same time raising their 
productivity (technically, they are increasing their capital to labor 
ratios). 
More aggregate analyses show that, in each of the past six recoveries, a 
higher level of manufacturing output has been attained with fewer workers 
working fewer hours. This is primarily a result of the long-run trend in 
productivity growth, combined with the cyclical effects of overhead reduction 
and the closing of the least efficient production facilties.7 
From a social viewpoint, declines in the employment of some manufacturing 
industries may result in severe hardships to the laid-off workers whose skills 
are not demanded in other industries or not in the region in which they seek 
employment. For these and other reasons, government has been assigned the 
important role in our society of providing income support via unemployment 
compensation, trade adjustment, and various welfare programs. Retraining is 
also offered through a variety of government programs. 
In any event, the point relevant to this study is that such employment 
problems may arise when a healthy industry is merely adjusting to changes in 
its environment. That is, low-tech industries are becoming more automated in 
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order to compete and survive in the marketplace. In many specific instances, 
company investments in new productive equipment have increased the 
productivity of individual workers and thus reduced the demand for total 
employment. For example, in the textile industry, lasers inspect 10,000 yards 
of cloth an hour -- 15 times faster than a human once could. In the steel 
industry, lasers and innovative sensing devices perform inspections and even 
check refractory lining wear in steelmaking furnaces.8 Economizing on labor 
costs, of course, can be a key to maintaining an industry's competitiveness. 
When the analysis of employment trends is limited to the 1970-82 period, 
the results for the most part are similar (see Table 8). 
The Manufacturing Sector Relative to the Economy 
Some of those who worry that low-tech industries are declining do not 
focus on decreases in output in an absolute sense. They consider an 
industry•s performance to be unsatisfactory if it is not growing as fast as 
the economy as a whole. Hence, if the low-tech industries are declining 
according to this definition, we should observe over the period from 1948 to 
1982 a significant negative trend in the ratio of industry income to national 
income. 
To test this hypothesis, the following equation is used: 
Yit = RiO + Bi1 t + Eit (2) 
where: Yit = ratio of real income produced by industry i to real national 
income, at time t 
t =year less 1948; 0 in 1948 
Eit = random error term for industry i at time t 
~i1 = the estimated trend for industry i. 
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Table 8 
TREND IN EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, 1970-1982 
I 
Trend in I 
Employment! High-tech industries 
Growth Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Instruments and related products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Stability Other transportation equipment 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
Decline None 
Sources: Tables A-18 and A-19. 
Low-tech industries 
Furniture and fixtures 
Printing and publishing 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Lumber and wood products 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Fabricated metal products 
Food and kindred products 
Paper and allied products 
Primary metal industries 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Leather and leather 
products 
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The methodology used to determine the sign of the trend coefficient, ~i1, can 
be found in the Appendix. 
Considering the results presented in Table 9, we see that all the 
high-tech industries have been growing at least as fast as the economY, four 
have been expanding at a faster rate. This should come as no surprise, 
because it is exactly what the proponents of an industrial policy have been 
claiming. But what about the low-tech industries? According to the 
proposition being examined, we should expect that these industries would 
demonstrate slower growth than the national average, or even a decline.· Once 
again, this is true of some, but certainly not all, of the low-tech 
industries. As can be seen in Table 9, nine of the fifteen industries are 
growing less rapidly than the economy as a whole. However, such industries as 
tobacco manufacturing, paper and allied products, and printing and publishing 
have been growing faster than the economY. Hence, any tendency for low-tech 
industries to grow more slowly than the economy is by no means universal. 
Redoing the analysis for the period 1970-82 does not significantly alter this 
conclusion {see Table 10). 
Summary 
The data on national income by industry, when viewed in real terms during 
the periods 1948-82 and 1970-82, do not support the claim that the old-line 
industries located in America's .. rust belt 11 are going the way of the 
dinosaur.9 All the industries, both high-tech and low-tech, show at least 
stability over these periods, with no examples of industries with absolute 
long-term declines in the level of their output. 
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Table 9 
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH RELATIVE TO 
GROWTH IN NATIONAL INCOME, 1948-1982 
Trend 
Growing 
Faster 
Than 
National 
Income 
High-tech industries 
Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Instruments and related products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Growing atl Other transportation equipment 
About the I Motor vehicles and equipment 
Same Rate 
Growing None 
More 
S 1 owly or 
Declining 
Sources: Tables A-20 and A-21. 
Low-tech industries 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Fabricated metal products 
Lumber and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Primary metal industries 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Food and kindred products 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Leather and leather products 
Trend 
Growing 
Faster 
Than 
National 
Income 
I 
Growing atl 
About the I 
Same Rate I 
Growing 
More 
S 1 owly or 
Declining 
I 
I 
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Table 10 
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH RELATIVE TO 
GROWTH IN NATIONAL INCOME, 1970-1982 
High-tech industries 
Machinery, except electrical 
Instruments and related products 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Other transportation equipment 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
Chemicals and allied products 
None 
Low-tech industries 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Petroleum and coal products 
Lumber and wood products 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Primary metal industries 
Fabricated metal products 
Food and kindred products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Leather and leather products 
Sources: Tables A-22 and A-23. 
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Shortcomings of Existing Industrial Policy 
In the debate on industrial policy proposals, it is important to note 
that many existing government policies affect industry in important ways and 
often have contributed to the difficulties faced by the manufacturing sector. 
These negative impacts of government action are, in the main, side effects of 
laws designed for other purposes-- providing a more equitable tax structure, 
redistributing income and wealth, enhancing the quality of life, improving the 
physical environment, and so forth. 
Intentionally or not, many of these policies have weakened the 
manufacturing sector of the economy, either by increasing its costs or by 
·reducing the amount of capital available for expansion and for new product 
development. This influence on the fundamental structure of American industry 
can be seen as manufacturing companies shift portions of their work force away 
from the creative and productive areas of business such as research and 
development, manufacturing, and marketing. The result has been an increase in 
such overhead functions as legal activities, accounting and finance, public 
affairs, and government relations.lO For the individual firm, changes in the 
corporate work force may be essential to respond to pressures from government 
agencies and self-styled public interest groups. But the effect of these 
shifts on national productivity and competitiveness is negative. Poorer 
industrial peformance, in turn, leads to calls for an industrial policy. 
If we overlook these structural responses to existing governmental 
policy, all that is visible are pleas for bailouts, subsidies, and other 
special assistance. But, on reflection, the willingness of government to bail 
out a Lockheed or a Chrysler is not surprising. It is the price that Congress 
pays to avoid dealing with the underlying industrial problems that arise from 
the present pattern of governmental intervention in the economy. 
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Variations on the negative theme of propping up the economy•s "losers" 
cover a great variety of proposals. Some would establish a national 
industrial development bank along the lines of the discredited Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation.ll Others would attempt to stop economic change by 
dealing with the so-called "runaway plant problem"; their response is to make 
it extremely difficult and costly to move or close down an industrial 
facility. This "King Canute" approach ignores the reasons why companies are 
forced to take such actions in the first place. Frequently, in fact, those 
plants have lost their competitiveness due in large part to the government 
policies advocated by the same groups that now support legislation against 
runaway plants. Such proposals also overlook the negative signals that would 
be sent to any company considering building a new plant in a region that has 
adopted restrictive legislation (and a few states already have done so). 
Close cousins of this negative approach are proposals to "protect" 
various industries and markets from foreign competition and to inhibit 
American investments overseas. None of these approaches would lead to a more 
productive or more competitive economy. Instead they would shelter companies 
and localities from their own mistakes. 
Concluding Thoughts 
The simple-minded dichotomy that sees only expanding high-tech and 
declining low-tech industries needs to be examined more carefully than has 
been done by the widely publicized prognosticators of the demise of 
traditional industry. If industrial giants of the past such as Andrew 
Carnegie and Harvey Firestone were to visit their old companies, they would be 
pleasantly surprised by the array of high technology now in use -- industrial 
robots, sophisticated process control, laser inspection, flexible 
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manufacturing systems (FMS), automated material handling, and CAD/CAM 
(computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing).12 
Deere & Company's sprawling tractor works provides a good example. The 
facility includes four FMS installations, and 16 machining centers groups 
of totally automated machines and conveyors linked to a computer. In 
addition, visitors can see robotic welding and robotic spray painting with 
computers providing total integration of conveyors, towlines, monorails, 
cranes, and automated storage and retrieval systems. There is hardly a 
conventional forklift truck in sight. 
Many companies have adopted 11 flexible manufacturing, .. a high-tech 
marriage of robots and computers. Deere's plant can turn out tractors in more 
than 5,000 configurations. General Electric now makes 2,000 versions of its 
basic electric meter at a single small plant.13 In a new facility, General 
Motors has installed a robot system that paints its cars. The man-machine 
interface is being redefined. Manual operations using gears, pulleys, and 
belts have often been replaced by microprocessors, keyboards, electronic 
switches, and cathode ray tubes. 
It is ironic that, just when the promoters of industrial policy in the 
United States are bemoaning the effects of reliance on free markets, writers 
in the Soviet Union are blaming that nation's poor economic performance on the 
centralized nature of the Soviet state. Here are some of the 11 outdated 
peculiarities of the system of state economic management .. that Soviet 
economists bemoan: 
o 
11 a very high degree of centralization in economic decision-making .. 
o 
11 the inhibition of market forces .. 
o 
11 a centralized system of allocation of materials and supplies to all 
enterpri ses 11 
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o 
11 the centralized regulation of all forms of material incentives for 
workers .. 
o 
11 overlapping authority and resulting confusion among ministries and 
agenci es 11 
o 
11 the limited economic authority and, as a result, the limited economic 
liability of enterprises for the results of their economic performance .. 
o .. restrictions on all forms of unregulated economic activity in the 
sphere of production, service and distribution ... 14 
It is intriguing to read the Soviet•s own description of how individuals 
attempt to adjust to this 11 most rigid regimentation of economic behavior 11 : 
11 
• the population always enjoys a certain amount of freedom to 
respond to the limitations imposed by the state • • • When established 
rules and regulation, for instance, limitations on the size of private 
plots, fishing limits, etc., affect the vital interests of certain 
categories of people, they look for ways to circumvent the constraints 
and satisfy their requirements. Then the state introduces still harsher 
measures to block undesirable forms of activity, in response to which the 
population comes up with more refined methods that make it possible to 
meet their interests under the new conditions ... 15 
All this, however, need not lead to a do-nothing approach to the serious 
economic questions that face the United States. There is a growth strategy 
that involves no expansion in government power or federal spending. Its 
elements are basic-- tax simplification, regulatory relief, lower deficit 
financing, and curtailed government lending. In each of these areas, much can 
be done. 
For example, the 1981 tax reductions were surely helpful. But the sad 
fact of the matter is that the tax code is far more complicated today than it 
was just a few years ago. To anyone who has ever tried to fill out the tax 
forms for a small company, it is clear that simplification is not just a 
pleasant thought, but rather a vitally important need. 
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Similarly, the regulatory relief effort has accomplished much in 
reducing the burden of new rules. But fundamental improvement can come only 
from revising existing statutes that mandate unreasonable burdens of 
compliance, such as the 11 Zero discharge .. goal of the Clean Water Act and the 
11 Zero risk 11 provision of the Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act. 
Furthermore, it is ironic to contemplate the numerous industrial policy 
proposals for funneling federal funds to 11Worthy 11 private investment areas at 
a time when the federal government is running budget deficits in the 
neighborhood of $200 billion a year. The most effective way to increase 
private capital formation is just the reverse of the federal investment bank 
approach; it is to reduce the federal drain on private saving represented by 
massive deficit financing. Federal lending programs are a classic example of 
robbing Peter to pay-- or lend to-- Paul. They do nothing to increase the 
pool of private saving. But they do reduce the amount available in the 
p ri va te rna rket. 
The most effective strategy for encouraging economic growth is no secret: 
it is to reduce government barriers and achieve a better functioning market 
economy. However, this approach is not accompanied by any guarantee. In a 
truly dynamic, competitive economy, we do not know in advance where the new 
product breakthroughs will occur. And the benefits will not be evenly 
distributed. But we do know that society as a whole will be better off, since 
it is likely that most-- though not all -- industrial workers and employers 
will enjoy higher real incomes and improved living standards. Surely positive 
public policy should enhance productivity, capital formation, and 
international competitiveness. The negative approaches embodied in most 
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industrial policy suggestions, which extend further the role of government in 
the economy, are adverse to these key economic goals. Hence, given the gap 
between the ideal embodied in most policy proposals and the shortcomings of 
actual practice, a cynic would perhaps conclude that the optimum amount of 
new government initiatives directed toward the industrial economy is zero. 
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r1ethodol ogy 
This section explains the procedure used to derive the empirical results 
presented in the section, 11Statistical Analysis of U.S. Manufacturing, 
1948-1982. 11 
The Data 
This study uses data on the national income produced in an industry 
excluding capital consumption allowances (NI) and full-time equivalent 
employees (N) as the prime indicators of the health of an industry. These 
data were obtained from the National Income and Products Accounts of the 
United States for the periods 1948-82 and 1970-82, via Citibase, as of 
September 1983. 
The national income data were deflated by either the implicit price 
deflator for Gross National Product produced by nondurable goods manufacturing 
industries or the deflator for durable goods manufacturing industries, 
depending upon whether the industry produces nondurable or durable goods (see 
Table A-4). This procedure results in the dependent variable, real national 
income without capital consumption allowances (RNI), which is used as an 
estimate of the output produced by each industry. The deflated figures are 
presented in Tables A-5 and A-6. 
Full-time equivalent employees, the second dependent variable used in 
this study, is defined as the number of workers employed on a full-time basis 
plus the number of workers employed on a part-time basis converted to 
full-time equivalents. The number of full-time equivalent employees in 
industry i is used as a proxy for total employment in that industry (see 
Tables A-7 and A-8). 
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The third dependent variable is the ratio of RNI produced by each 
industry to total RNI (see Tables A-9 and A-10). Real values for RNI were 
used rather than nominal, because of the different deflators employed. 
The last variable, which is used as an independent variable, is the 
capacity utilization rate for manufacturing industries. For the period 1948 
to 1966, the capacity utilization rate for total manufacturing is used for 
both nondurable and durable goods manufacturing industries because 
disaggregated figures were not available (see Table A-11). 
The Equations 
As presented in the body of the paper, the basic equation used to 
determine the statistical significance of the trend coefficient (~i1) for each 
indus try is: 
Yit = BiO + ~i1 t + Eit 
where: Yit = the dependent variable for industry i at time t 
t =year less 1948; 0 in 1948 
Eit =random error term for industry i at time t. 
(A-1) 
The estimated ~i1 (~i1) from this equation is an arithmetic trend based on 
the assumption that industry i grows or declines by a constant amount each 
year. 
The second equation used in this analysis is an extension of equation 
A-1. In this case, equation A-1 remains the same, except that now the 
capacity utilization rate (CUR) is included as an independent variable. The 
equation is: 
Yit = BiO + ~i1 t + Ai2 CURt+ Eit (A-2) 
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where: Yit, t, and £it are defined as in equation A-1 
CURt= capacity utilization rate at time t. 
The capacity utilization rate is used as an explanatory variable to account 
for cyclical fluctuations in the time-series data, so that a better 
measurement of the trend can be derived. CUR can be considered an 
approximation for these cyclical movements. That is, it is used to account 
for changes in the dependent variable due to cyclical behavior in contrast to 
long-run secular changes over time. 
When the coefficients for industry i are estimated, the capacity 
utilization rates for nondurable goods manufacturing industries (NCUR) or 
durable goods manufacturing industries (DCUR) are used, depending upon whether 
industry i produces nondurable or durable goods, when available. 
Autocorrelated Error Terms 
The implications of autocorrelated error terms for the analysis of 
time-series data have been documented in many sources.16 In order to test and 
correct (if needed) for this problem, the following procedure was used. 
1) Use ordinary-least-squares (OLS) to estimate the coefficients of 
the equations, and to calculate the Durbin-Watson d statistic. 
2) Test for positive first-order autocorrelation using the following 
method: 
Ho: there is no positive first-order autocorrelation 
If d ( du, reject Ho 
If d > du, do not reject Ho 
where: d = the Durbin-Watson d statistic calculated in step 1 
du = the upper critical value for the Durbin-Watson d statistic 
obtained at a 5% level of significance.17 
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If d is less than or equal to du~ there is positive first-order 
autocorrelation present in the time-series data. However, if d is 
greater than du, the null hypothesis of no positive first-order 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected. 
The justification for using only the upper critical value~ du, and 
thus disregarding the indeterminate region is that we are dealing with 
time-series data which characteristically contains positively 
correlated error terms. Hence, we will suspect positive first-order 
autocorrelation unless the test does not reject the null hypothesis. 
3) If the null hypothesis is not rejected, there is no need to correct 
for positive first-order autocorrelation. The results from the OLS 
estimation are presented along with the d statistics in Tables A-12 to 
A-23. However, if the null hypothesis were rejected~ the equation is 
reestimated using the two-step full transform method (TSFTM)18 and 
the results are presented along with their estimated autocorrelation 
coefficient (p). For example, in Table A-14, food and kindred 
products (SIC20) was estimated using OLS, while tobacco manufacturing 
(SIC21) used TSFTM. 
Significance of the Trend Coefficient, ~i1 
After the equations have been estimated, whether by OLS or TSFTM, 
the last step is to determine the significance of the trend coefficient (~i1). 
The procedure is as follows: 
Ho: Si1 = 0 
Ha: ~i1 * 0 
If lt*l < t, do not reject Ho 
If lt*l > t, reject Ho in favor of Ha 
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where: t* = the calculated t statistic for ~i1 
t = the critical value of the student t distribution at a 2.5% level 
of significance. 
Once it has been determined that the coefficient is not equal to zero, 
the sign of the estimated coefficient is used to determine whether the trend 
is significantly positive or negative. That is, if the estimated coefficient 
is positive then the trend is positive, and if the estimated coefficient is 
negative the trend is considered negative. 
The Results 
The estimated equations used to construct Tables 4, 5, and 7 through 10 
are presented in Tables A-12 to A-23. The results presented in Table A-12, as 
well as the other tables containing regression results, are as follows: 
Regressions: the estimated coefficients along with their t statistics 
R2: the coefficient of determination 
SSE: the sum of squared errors 
DFE: the degrees of freedom 
d: the Durbin-Watson d statistic 
p: the estimated correlation coefficent, and 
Class: the classification of each industry based on Table 3. 
These estimates, along with the method described above, are used to 
construct the tables. 
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Table A-1 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
NIPA Industry 
Nondurable Goods Industries 
Food and kindred products 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Chemicals and allied products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 
Leather and leather products 
Durable Goods Industries 
Lumber and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Stone, clay, and glass products 
Primary metal industries 
Fabricated metal products 
Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic equipment 
Other transportation equipment 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
Instruments and related products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
SIC Codes 
20 
21 
22 
23 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
24 
25 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
372-9 
371 
38 
39 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States and U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual, 1972. 
Table A-2 
NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(billions of dollars) 
National 
Year Income SIC20 SIC21 SIC22 SIC23 SIC26 SIC27 SIC28 SIC29 SIC30 SIC31 
1948 226.7 7.6 0.4 5.0 3.6 2.4 3.4 4.0 3.9 1.3 1.3 
1949 220.1 7.5 0.5 4.0 3.4 2.2 3.5 4.1 3.0 1.2 1.1 
1950 244.0 7.7 0.5 4.4 3.5 2.7 3.7 4.9 3.4 1.4 1.1 
1951 281.7 8.2 0.5 5.1 3.9 3.4 3.9 5.9 4.1 2.0 1.3 
1952 295.5 8.9 0.6 4.5 4.0 3.2 4.2 5.7 3.8 2.1 1.4 
1953 309.0 9.3 0.7 4.3 4.2 3.3 4.5 6.0 4.4 2.2 1.4 
1954 307.2 9.4 0.7 3.7 4.0 3.4 4.7 6.1 4.4 1.9 1.4 
1955 335.5 10.3 0.7 4.2 4.2 3.8 5.1 7.2 4.8 2.3 1.4 
1956 355.7 10.4 0.8 4.3 4.5 4.3 5.5 7.5 5.1 2.6 1.5 
1957 371.7 10.7 0.8 4.0 4.4 4.1 5.8 7.9 4.5 2.6 1.5 
1958 373.4 11.2 0.9 3.9 4.4 4.1 5.7 7.7 4.0 2.5 1.4 
1959 406.8 12.0 1.0 4.5 4.8 4.6 6.3 9.0 4.5 2.9 1.6 
1960 420.8 12.2 1.1 4.5 4.9 4.7 6.7 8.9 4.4 2.9 1.6 
1961 433.3 12.5 1.1 4.3 5.0 4.9 6.8 9.3 4.2 3.0 1.6 
1962 463.4 12.9 1.1 4.7 5.4 5.1 7.1 9.6 4.1 3.4 1.7 
1963 488.6 13.5 1.2 4.8 5.6 5.3 7.4 10.4 4.1 3.5 1.7 
1964 524.2 14.0 1.2 5.2 6.0 5.6 . 8.3 11.1 4.3 3.8 1.8 
1965 571.1 14.5 1.1 5.9 6.6 6.0 8.7 12.2 4.9 4.2 1.9 w ~ 
1966 627.0 15.7 1.1 6.4 7.2 6.7 9.6 13.4 5.3 4.8 2.1 
1967 661.5 16.2 1.3 6.3 7.5 6.8 9.9 13.4 6.1 5.0 2.1 
1968 722.7 17.1 1.3 7.1 8.2 7.5 10.8 15.3 6.2 5.9 2.3 
1969 780.8 18.0 1.4 7.5 8.7 8.2 11.7 15.6 6.0 6.3 2.2 
1970 814.8 19.3 1.7 7.5 8.7 8.2 11.9 15.7 6.5 6.0 2.2 
1971 878.1 20.2 1.8 7.7 8.9 8.4 12.5 16.7 6.9 6.8 2.2 
1972 969.9 20.5 1.7 8.5 9.8 9.5 13.5 18.2 6.7 7.7 2.2 
1973 1,094.1 21.2 1.8 9.1 10.3 10.9 15.0 20.3 8.8 8.8 2.4 
1974 1,176.8 23.5 1.9 9.7 10.5 12.0 15.2 22.0 14.6 8.7 2.4 
1975 1,267.4 30.7 2.3 8.9 10.9 11.8 16.8 24.8 14.8 8.7 2.4 
1976 1,413.0 31.2 2.6 10.8 12.4 14.2 18.6 28.6 18.7 9.9 2.8 
1977 1,586.0 33.5 2.9 12.3 13.7 15.5 21.2 30.8 18.5 12.3 2.9 
1978 1,802.0 35.4 3.4 12.8 14.8 17.2 23.7 33.4 21.3 13.9 3.2 
1979 2,015.8 38.1 3.8 13.7 15.3 19.3 26.0 35.5 28.3 15.1 3.3 
1980 2,174.0 41.3 4.1 13.4 16.1 19.6 28.1 37.0 36.3 14.9 3.8 
1981 2,426.5 47.1 4.8 14.3 17.2 21.3 30.6 41.6 36.2 17.6 4.1 
1982 2,492.4 47.2 4.9 13.5 17.1 20.4 32.5 41.4 33.7 17.2 4.2 
Note: Figures are rounded. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of 
the United States, obtained via Citibase (September 1983). 
Table A-3 
NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(billions of dollars) 
Year SIC24 SIC25 SIC32 SIC33 SIC34 SIC35 SIC36 SIC372-9 SIC371 SIC38 SIC39 
1948 2.8 1.2 2.3 6.0 4.6 6.3 4.0 1.9 4.0 1.1 1.6 
1949 2.4 1.1 2.2 5.4 4.3 5.8 3.7 2.0 4.8 1.1 1.5 
1950 3.0 1.4 2.8 7.2 5.4 6.6 4.8 2.1 6.6 1.4 1.7 
1951 3.4 1.5 3.2 9.0 6.6 9.1 5.7 3.5 6.3 1.8 1.8 
1952 3.2 1.6 3.0 7.8 6.7 10.0 6.6 5.3 6.4 2.0 1.8 
1953 3.1 1.6 3.3 9.3 7.4 10.0 7.3 6.3 7.6 2.3 2.0 
1954 3.0 1.5 3.4 7.7 6.9 9.1 6.7 6.1 6.4 2.2 1.9 
1955 3.5 1.8 4.1 10.2 7.7 9.6 7.1 6.1 9.5 2.4 2.1 
1956 3.6 1.9 4.2 10.9 8.2 11.4 7.9 6.6 7.4 2.7 2.2 
1957 3.1 1.9 4.2 11.4 8.7 11.5 8.7 7.7 7.8 2.8 2.2 
1958 3.1 1.7 4.1 9.2 7.9 9.9 8.3 7.5 5.4 2.9 2.1 
1959 3.7 2.0 4.8 10.4 8.8 11.8 10.2 7.7 8.0 3.3 2.3 
1960 3.5 2.0 4.6 10.5 8.8 11.9 10.5 7.4 8.4 3.4 2.3 
1961 3.4 2.0 4.5 9.8 8.9 11.9 10.8 7.8 7.4 3.4 2.4 
1962 3.6 2.2 4.7 10.3 9.8 13.5 12.0 8.8 9.8 3.7 2.5 
1963 4.0 2.3 5.1 11.0 10.3 14.2 12.2 9.6 11.3 3.8 2.6 
1964 4.4 2.5 5.4 12.5 1~_.2 16.2 12.6 9.9 11.8 4.0 2.7 
1965 4.9 2.8 5.7 13.9 12.6 18.4 14.7 10.4 14.5 4.6 2.9 ..p:. 0 
1966 4.9 3.1 5.9 15.4 14.4 21.3 17.0 12.7 14.2 5.5 3.2 
1967 5.0 3.1 5.8 14.4 15.2 21.9 18.1 13.8 12.6 5.8 3.3 
1968 5.8 3.4 6.3 14.7 16.4 22.9 19.3 14.6 15.9 6.3 3.6 
1969 6.5 3.7 7.0 15.7 17.5 24.7 20.4 14.0 16.0 6.8 3.8 
1970 6.1 3.5 6.9 15.2 16.4 24.7 19.8 12.6 12.0 6.3 3.8 
1971 6.8 3.7 7.6 15.1 17.0 23.8 20.2 12.1 17.6 6.5 4.1 
1972 8.3 4.4 8.7 17.9 19.4 27.7 22.6 13.1 20.1 7.2 4.6 
1973 9.8 4.7 9.8 21.3 22.4 32.3 26.2 14.3 22.9 8.1 4.9 
1974 9.7 4.7 9.9 27.1 23.3 34.9 25.7 14.6 17.5 8.5 4.8 
1975 8.4 4.6 10.0 24.3 24.5 37.2 26.7 16.0 19.2 9.2 5.5 
1976 11.2 5.4 11.9 26.3 27.9 41.7 30.7 17.-7 27.4 10.6 6.1 
1977 13.3 6.2 13.4 28.5 31.5 49.0 35.9 19.6 33.3 12.2 6.9 
1978 15.8 7.3 15.7 34.4 35.8 56.1 41.5 22.8 35.1 14.0 7.3 
1979 17.0 7.7 17.1 38.4 39.9 63.8 45.0 26.3 32.4 15.3 7.6 
1980 15.1 7.9 16.4 37.6 40.6 68.4 49.9 29.0 21.9 17.4 7.8 
1981 14.3 8.6 17.0 41.7 43.9 76.8 55.2 31.9 26.3 20.1 9.6 
1982 12.6 8.4 14.9 26.9 40.8 69.9 55.4 33.6 23.9 21.2 9.1 
Note: Figures are rounded. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, obtained via Citibase (September 1983). 
Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 . 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
41 
Table A-4 
IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATORS FOR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 
NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, AND 
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(1972=100) 
GNP* 
Nondurable 
Goods 
Durable 
Goods 
53.0 
52.5 
53.6 
57.1. 
57.9 
58.8 
59.6 
60.8 
62.8 
64.9 
66.0 
67.6 
68.7 
69.3 
70.6 
71.7 
72.8 
74.4 
76.8 
79.1 
82.5 
86.8 
91.5 
96.0 
100.0 
105.7 
114.9 
125.6 
132.3 
140.1 
150.4 
163.4 
178.4 
195.1 
206.9 
73.9 
71.7 
71.6 
77.2 
78.1 
79.0 
78.7 
80.7 
82.6 
82.8 
83.9 
85.4 
87.1 
87.1 
86.6 
84.3 
85.4 
86.5 
88.4 
91.5 
94.3 
95.7 
100.0 
101.2 
100.0 
99.4 
111.2 
124.6 
131.0 
137.3 
144.4 
152.5 
164.1 
176.9 
189.7 
53.0 
56.1 
58.6 
61.6 
62.5 
64.2 
66.3 
68.3 
71.8 
75.5 
78.5 
80.5 
81.3 
81.7 
83.1 
81.7 
81.1 
81.6 
82.9 
84.9 
88.2 
90.7 
94.2 
98.4 
100.0 
100.9 
108.0 
123.0 
128.2 
136.9 
145.7 
154.1 
166.7 
179.5 
186.3 
*Figures are rounded. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 
1929-76 and Survey of Current Business, various issues. 
Table A-5 
REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(billions of 1972 dollars) 
National 
Year Income SIC20 SIC21 SIC22 SIC23 SIC26 SIC27 SIC28 SIC29 SIC30 SIC31 
1948 428.0 10.3 0.6 6.8 4.9 3.2 4.5 5.5 5.3 1.8 1.7 
1949 419.3 10.4 0.7 5.6 4.8 3.0 4.9 5.7 4.2 1.7 1.6 
1950 455.7 10.8 0.7 6.2 4.9 3.8 5.2 6.8 4.8 2.0 1.6 
1951 493.5 10.6 0.7 6.5 5.1 4.4 5.1 7.6 5.3 2.6 1.7 
1952 510.2 11.4 0.8 5.7 5.2 4.0 5.4 7.3 4.9 2.7 1.7 
1953 525.3 11.8 0.9 5.4 5.3 4.2 5.7 7.6 5.6 2.8 1.7 
1954 515.9 12.0 0.9 4.7 5.0 4.3 6.0 7.8 5.6 2.4 1.7 
1955 551.5 12.8 0.9 5.2 5.2 4.7 6.4 9.0 5.9 2.8 1.7 
1956 566.5 12.6 0.9 5.2 5.4 5.2 6.6 9.1 6.1 3.1 1.8 
1957 572.4 12.9 1.0 4.9 5.4 5.0 7.0 9.5 5.4 3.2 1.8 
1958 565.4 13.3 1.0 4.6 5.3 4.9 6.8 9.1 4.8 3.0 1.7 
1959 601.7 14.1 1.1 5.3 5.6 5.4 7.4 10.6 5.3 3.4 1.9 
1960 612.4 14.0 1.2 5.1 5.7 5.4 7.6 10.2 5.1 3.4 1.8 
1961 624.9 14.4 1.2 5.0 5.8 5.6 7.8 10.7 4.8 3.5 1.8 
1962 656.2 14.9 1.3 5.4 6.3 5.9 8.2 11.1 4.7 3.9 1.9 
1963 681.7 16.0 1.5 5.7 6.7 6.3 8.8 12.3 4.9 4.2 2.1 
1964 720.4 16.4 1.4 6.1 7.0 6.6 9.7 13.0 5.1 4.5 2.1 
1965 768.0 16.7 1.3 6.8 7.6 7.0 10.1 14.1 5.6 4.9 2.2 -+:::> N 
1966 816.8 17.7 1.3 7.2 8.1 7.6 10.9 15.1 6.0 5.4 2.3 
1967 836.7 17.7 1.4 6.9 8.2 7.5 10.9 14.7 6.7 5.5 2.3 
1968 875.5 18.2 1.4 7.5 8.7 7.9 11.4 16.2 6.5 6.2 2.4 
1969 899.6 18.8 1.5 7.8 9.0 8.6 12.2 16.3 6.2 6.6 2.3 
1970 891.0 19.3 1.7 7.5 8.7 8.2 11.9 15.7 6.5 6.0 2.2 
1971 914.6 20.0 1.8 7.6 8.8 8.3 12.4 16.5 6.8 6.7 2.2 
1972 969.9 20.5 1.7 8.5 9.8 9.5 13.5 18.2 6.7 7.7 2.2 
1973 1,035.2 21.4 1.8 9.1 10.4 11.0 15.1 20.4 8.9 8.9 2.4 
1974 1,024.0 21.2 1.7 8.7 9.5 10.8 13.7 19.8 13.1 7.8 2.2 
1975 1,009.4 24.6 1.9 7.1 8.7 9.5 13.5 19.9 11.9 7.0 1.9 
1976 1,067.7 23.8 2.0 8.2 9.5 10.8 14.2 21.9 14.3 7.6 2.2 
1977 1,132.4 24.4 2.1 9.0 10.0 11.3 15.4 22.4 13.5 9.0 2.1 
1978 1,198.0 24.5 2.4 8.9 10.2 11.9 16.4 23.1 14.7 9.6 2.2 
1979 1,233.5 25.0 2.5 9.0 10.0 12.6 17.1 23.2 18.6 9.9 2.1 
1980 1,218.5 25.2 2.5 8.2 9.8 11.9 17.1 22.5 22.1 9.1 2.3 
1981 1,243.4 26.6 2.7 8.1 9.7 12.0 17.3 23.5 20.5 10.0 2.3 
1982 1,204.8 24.9 2.6 7.1 9.0 10.8 17.2 21.8 17.7 9.1 2.2 
Note: Figures are rounded. 
Source: Computed from data in Tables A-2 and A-4. 
Table A-6 
REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(billions of 1972 dollars) 
Year SIC24 SIC25 SIC32 SIC33 SIC34 SIC35 SIC36 SIC372-9 SIC371 SIC38 SIC39 
1948 5.4 2.2 4.3 11.3 8.7 11.9 7.5 3.6 7.6 2.1 3.0 
1949 4.3 2.0 4.0 9.7 7.6 10.3 6.7 3.5 8.6 1.9 2.6 
1950 5.2 2.3 4.8 12.2 9.2 11.3 8.1 3.6 11.2 2.3 2.9 
1951 5.5 2.4 5.2 14.6 10.6 14.8 9.3 5.7 10.2 2.9 3.0 
1952 5.1 2.5 4.8 12.5 10.7 15.9 10.5 8.4 10.2 3.2 2.9 
1953 4.9 2.5 5.2 14.4 11.6 15.7 11.3 9.8 11.8 3.5 3.0 
1954 4.5 2.3 5.1 11.6 10.4 13.8 10.0 9.3 9.7 3.4 2.8 
1955 5.1 2.6 5.9 14.9 11.2 14.1 10.3 8.9 14.0 3.5 3.1 
1956 5.0 2.6 5.9 15.2 11.4 15.8 11.0 9.2 10.3 3.8 3.0 
1957 4.1 2.5 5.5 15.1 11.5 15.3 11.5 10.2 10.3 3.8 2.9 
1958 4.0 2.2 5.2 11.7 10.0 12.6 10.6 9.6 6.9 3.6 2.7 
1959 4.7 2.5 5.9 13.0 10.9 14.7 12.7 9.6 9.9 4.0 2.9 
1960 4.3 2.5 5.6 13.0 10.9 14.6 12.9 9.1 10.3 4.1 2.9 
1961 4.1 2.4 5.5 11.9 10.9 14.6 13.3 9.6 9.1 4.1 3.0 
1962 4.4 2.6 5.7 12.4 11.7 16.3 14.4 10.6 11.8 4.5 3.1 
1963 4.9 2.8 6.2 13.5 12.6 17.4 14.9 11.7 13.9 4.7 3.1 
1964 5.5 3.1 6.7 15.4 13.8 20.0 15.5 12.2 14.5 5.0 3.3 
1965 6.0 3.5 6.9 17.1 15.5 22.5 18.0 12.8 17.8 5.6 3.5 ...j:::::. w 
1966 6.0 3.8 7.1 18.6 17.4 25.7 20.5 15.3 17.1 6.6 3.9 
1967 5.9 3.7 6.8 17.0 18.0 25.8 21.3 16.2 14.8 6.8 3.9 
1968 6.6 3.9 7.2 16.7 18.6 26.0 21.9 16.6 18.1 7.1 4.1 
1969 7.2 4.1 7.7 17.3 19.3 27 : 2 22.5 15.5 17.6 7.5 4.2 
1970 6.5 3.7 7.3 16.1 17.5 26.3 21.0 13.4 12.7 6.7 4.0 
1971 6.9 3.8 7.8 15.4 17.2 24.2 20.5 12.3 17.9 6.6 4.2 
1972 8.3 4.4 8.7 17.9 19.4 27.7 22.6 13.1 20.1 7.2 4.6 
1973 9.7 4.6 9.7 21.1 22.2 32.0 25.9 14.2 22.7 8.0 4.8 
1974 9.0 4.4 9.1 25.1 21.6 32.4 23.8 13.5 16.2 7.9 4.5 
1975 6.9 3.7 8.1 19.8 19.9 30.3 21.7 13.0 15.6 7.5 4.5 
1976 8.7 4.2 9.3 20.5 21.7 32.6 24.0 13.8 21.3 8.2 4.8 
1977 9.7 4.5 9.8 20.8 23.0 35.8 26.2 14.3 24.3 8.9 5.0 
1978 10.8 5.0 10.8 23.6 24.6 38.5 28.4 15.6 24.1 9.6 5.0 
1979 11.1 5.0 11.1 24.9 25.9 41.4 29.2 17.0 21.0 9.9 4.9 
1980 9.1 4.7 9.9 22.5 24.4 41.0 29.9 17.4 13.1 10.4 4.7 
1981 8.0 4.8 9.5 23.2 24.5 42.8 30. 7. 17.8 14.6 11.2 5.3 
1982 6.8 4.5 8.0 14.4 21.9 37.5 29.7 18.0 12.9 11.4 4.9 
Note: Figures are rounded. 
Source: Computed from data in Tables A-3 and A-4. 
Table A-7 
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES IN NONDURABLE GOODS 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(thousands of employees) 
Year SIC20 SIC21 SIC22 SIC23 SIC26 SIC27 SIC28 SIC29 SIC30 SIC31 
1948 1,783 99 1,329 1,196 470 720 633 220 322 406 
1949 1,753 101 1,186 1,167 451 717 599 214 297 389 
1950 1,750 96 1,243 1,181 482 722 617 216 320 391 
1951 1,780 104 1,220 1,180 504 736 687 227 345 374 
1952 1,764 103 1,139 1,185 497 738 708 231 346 375 
1953 1,754 103 1,129 1,202 523 752 746 235 366 375 
1954 1,719 101 1,016 1,135 522 756 729 232 337 356 
1955 1,706 99 1,021 1,160 537 766 745 231 365 366 
1956 1,709 95 996 1,154 554 780 773 229 373 360 
1957 1,702 92 953 1,142 555 800 793 232 377 358 
1958 1,637 90 885 1,083 542 788 758 219 351 339 
1959 1,651 90 913 1,141 567 804 778 209 382 354 
1960 1,671 90 890 1,152 576 830 793 202 384 343 
1961 1,654 87 860 1,130 582 837 792 194 377 339 
1962 1,647 87 873 1,179 598 849 803 189 422 340 
1963 1,634 86 860 1,192 605 852 818 185 431 331 
1964 1,637 88 861 1,209 607 870 830 180 444 330 ~ ~ 
1965 1,663 86 901 1,269 628 903 869 178 483 339 
1966 1,685 83 941 1,324 656 941 925 179 527 349 
1967 1,704 84 943 1,322 672 974 965 179 534 341 
1968 1,702 82 . 974 1,334 681 991 993 183 573 345 
1969 1,715 79 984 1,342 705 1,012 1,022 186 613 328 
1970 1,711 79 945 1,287 694 1,017 1,009 187 593 304 
1971 1,673 74 934 1,264 669 978 974 186 592 284 
1972 1,650 74 969 1,307 674 983 963 183 642 286 
1973 1,645 76 1,003 1,344 689 1,009 991 184 693 282 
1974 1,635 77 951 1,267 688 1,012 1,014 189 689 263 
1975 1,588 71 824 1,161 628 981 1,008 187 585 234 
1976 1,611 70 887 1,252 662 997 1,039 193 637 255 
1977 1,632 68 887 1,250 679 1,035 1,067 198 702 246 
1978 1,655 67 881 1,268 690 1,080 1,089 203 739 247 
1979 1,660 68 864 1,237 697 1,129 1,104 205 766 234 
1980 1,625 66 820 1,200 681 1,138 1,099 202 708 227 
1981 1,606 68 794 1,184 678 1,153 1,098 210 723 230 
1982 1,563 66 715 1,087 650 1,149 1,068 193 676 209 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, obtained via Citibase (September 1983). 
Table A-8 
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES IN DURABLE GOODS 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
{thousands of employees) 
Year SIC24 SIC25 SIC32 SIC33 SIC34 SIC35 SIC36 SIC372-9 SIC371 SIC38 SIC39 
1948 862 334 556 1,231 1,085 1,384 975 472 757 271 416 
1949 752 310 517 1,084 983 1,189 839 458 733 248 381 
1950 815 357 549 1,185 1,083 1,214 961 452 797 271 399 
1951 864 348 586 1,295 1,190 1,468 1,085 696 835 320 399 
1952 805 349 565 1,225 1,215 1,544 1,169 998 778 349 390 
1953 774 356 575 1,306 1,320 1,566 1,300 1,143 899 381 418 
1954 706 329 548 1,164 1,198 1,412 1,169 1,034 765 360 395 
1955 746 354 578 1,266 1,260 1,438 1,214 987 874 365 397 
1956 737 361 592 1,300 1,282 1,549 1,286 1,051 784 388 401 
1957 664 361 582 1,294 1,297 1,554 1,309 1,122 755 401 383 
1958 618 337 547 1,082 1,145 1,327 1,185 1,009 596 375 358 
1959 661 358 586 1,113 1,205 1,432 1,346 1,014 666 395 372 
1960 641 357 591 1 J 1.50 1,217 1,447 1,419 936 699 402 375 
1961 595 341 569 1,077 1,179 1,398 1,429 920 628 394 366 
1962 605 360 579 1,101 1,241 1,475 1,531 980 686 405 379 
1963 612 363 589 1,110 1,259 1,513 1,505 990 729 409 378 
1964 634 378 602 1,159 1,290 1,586 1,480 965 748 407 385 +::> U1 
1965 651 403 621 1,234 1,375 1,730 1,590 998 828 436 407 
1966 662 436 639 1,278 1,496 1,910 1,836 1,170 863 491 424 
1967 645 428 624 1,250 1,540 1,955 1,886 1,238 816 511 419 
1968 661 443 630 1,248 1,590 1,947 1,902 1,247 870 529 423 
1969 679 452 652 1,283 1,649 2,007 1,954 1,211 906 545 429 
1970 665 421 632 1,243 1,532 1,954 1,843 1,027 797 524 410 
1971 689 419 621 1,154 1,442 1,783 1,705 894 838 489 405 
1972 712 459 645 1,165 1,492 1,864 1,757 915 877 515 416 
1973 734 489 681 1,250 1,606 2,053 1,939 948 961 556 433 
1974 692 469 671 1,271 1,596 2,193 1,949 950 901 579 433 
1975 588 397 618 1,118 1,428 2,023 1,676 905 778 539 393 
1976 655 432 633 1,137 1,488 2,048 1,753 902 871 565 410 
1977 695 452 653 1,175 1,547 2,148 1,853 924 941 607 421 
1978 732 479 690 1,210 1,631 2,304 1,991 992 996 642 432 
1979 744 480 700 1,241 1,675 2,462 - 2,100 1,071 988 678 427 
1980 658 449 651 1,134 1,579 2,446 2,075 1,096 787 695 400 
1981 631 448 631 1,109 1,560 2,461 2,075 1,096 787 714 392 
1982 563 413 559 902 1,398 2,220 1,989 1,025 698 704 365 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, obtained via Citibase {September 1983). 
Table A-9 
RATIO OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY NONDURABLE GOODS 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES TO REAL NATIONAL INCOME 
Year SIC20 SIC21 SIC22 SIC23 SIC26 SIC27 SIC28 SIC29 SIC30 SIC31 
1948 0.0241 0.0013 0.0159 0.0114 0.0074 0.0106 0.0128 0.0123 0.0042 0.0040 
1949 0.0248 0.0016 0.0134 0.0114 0.0073 0.0117 0.0135 0.0101 0.0041 0.0037 
1950 0.0237 0.0014 0.0135 0.0108 0.0083 0.0113 0.0149 0.0106 0.0043 0.0035 
1951 0.0215 0.0014 0.0133 0.0103 0.0089 0.0103 0.0155 0.0108 0.0053 0.0035 
1952 0.0223 0.0015 0.0112 0.0101 0.0079 0.0105 0.0142 0.0096 0.0053 0.0034 
1953 0.0225 0.0017 0.0103 0.0100 0.0080 0.0109 0.0144 0.0107 0.0053 0.0033 
1954 0.0232 0.0017 0.0091 0.0098 0.0084 0.0116 0.0151 0.0109 0.0047 0.0033 
1955 0.0232 0.0016 0.0094 0.0094 0.0086 0.0116 0.0163 0.0107 0.0052 0.0031 
1956 0.0222 0.0016 0.0091 0.0096 0.0092 0.0117 0.0160 0.0108 0.0055 0.0032 
1957 0.0226 0.0017 0.0085 o.op93 0.0087 0.0122 0.0166 0.0095 0.0055 0.0032 
1958 0.0235 0.0019 0.0082 0.0093 0.0086 0.0121 0.0162 o~oo85 0.0053 0.0030 
1959 0.0234 0.0019 0.0088 0.0093 0.0090 0.0122 0.0176 0.0087 0.0057 0.0031 
1960 0.0229 0.0020 0.0084 0.0093 0.0088 0.0125 0.0167 0.0083 0.0055 0.0030 
1961 0.0230 0.0019 0.0080 0.0092 0.0090 0.0125 0.0171 0.0077 0.0056 0.0029 
1962 0.0227 0.0020 0.0082 0.0095 0.0090 0.0125 0.0170 . 0.0072 0.0060 0.0030 
1963 0.0235 0.0021 0.0083 0.0098 0.0092 0.0129 0.0180 0.0071 0.0061 0.0030 
1964 0.0228 0.0019 0.0085 0.0097 0.0091 0.0134 0.0181 0.0071 0.0062 0.0029 
1965 0.0218 0.0017 0.0089 0.0099 0.0091 0.0131 0.0184 0.0073 0.0063 0.0028 +::> 0) 
1966 0.0217 0.0016 0.0088 0.0099 0.0093 0.0133 0.0185 0.0074 0.0066 0.0029 
1967 0.0212 0.0017 0.0082 0.0098 0.0089 0.0130 0.0175 0.0080 0.0066 0.0028 
1968 0.0208 0.0016 0.0086 0.0099 0.0091 0.0130 0.0185 0.0075 0.0071 0.0028 
1969 0.0209 0.0017 0.0087 0.0101 0.0095 0.0136 0.0182 0.0069 0.0074 0.0026 
1970 0.0216 0.0019 0.0085 0.0098 0.0092 0.0133 0.0176 0.0073 0.0067 0.0025 
1971 0.0219 0.0019 0.0083 0.0096 0.0090 0.0135 0.0180 0.0075 0.0073 0.0024 
1972 0.0211 0.0018 0.0087 0.0101 0.0097 0.0140 0.0188 0.0069 0.0080 0.0022 
1973 0.0206 0.0018 0.0088 0.0100 0.0106 0.0146 0.0197 0.0086 0.0086 0.0023 
1974 0.0207 0.0017 0.0085 0.0092 0.0105 0.0134 0.0193 0.0128 0.0076 0.0021 
1975 0.0244 0.0019 0.0071 0.0087 0.0094 0.0134 0.0197 0.0118 0.0069 0.0019 
1976 0.0223 0.0019 0.0077 0.0089 0.0101 0.0133 0.0205 0.0134 0.0071 0.0020 
1977 0.0216 0.0018 0.0079 0.0088 0.0100 0.0136 0.0198 0.0119 0.0079 0.0018 
1978 0.0204 0.0020 0.0074 0.0085 0.0099 0.0137 0.0193 0.0123 0.0080 0.0019 
1979 0.0202 0.0020 0.0073 0.0081 0.0103 0.0138 0.0188 0.0150 0.0080 0.0017 
1980 0.0207 0.0021 0.0067 0.0081 0.0098 0.0141 0.0185 0.0181 0.0074 0.0019 
1981 0.0214 0.0022 0.0065 0.0078 0.0097 0.0139 0.0189 0.0165 0.0080 0.0019 
1982 0.0207 0.0022 0.0059 0.0075 0.0089 0.0142 0.0181 0.0147 0.0075 0.0018 
Note: Figures may not correspon~ to the results derived from the preceding table due to rounding. 
Source: Computed from data in Table A-5. 
Table A-10 
RATIO OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY DURABLE GOODS 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES TO REAL NATIONAL INCOME 
Year SIC24 SIC25 SIC32 SIC33 SIC34 SIC35 SIC36 SIC372-9 SIC371 SIC38 SIC39 
1948 0.0125 0.0051 0.0101 0.0264 0.0204 0.0279 0.0175 0.0085 0.0178 0.0049 0.0071 
1949 0.0102 0.0048 0.0095 0.0231 0.0182 0.0245 0.0159 0.0083 0.0204 0.0046 0.0062 
1950 0.0114 0.0051 0.0105 0.0268 0.0202 0.0248 0.0178 0.0080 0.0247 0.0051 0.0065 
1951 0.0112 0.0049 0.0105 0.0296 0.0216 0.0301 0.0188 0.0115 0.0207 0.0058 0.0060 
1952 0.0100 0.0049 0.0095 0.0246 0.0209 0.0312 0.0206 0.0166 0.0200 0.0063 0.0058 
1953 0.0093 0.0047 0.0099 0.0275 0.0220 0.0298 0.0216 0.0187 0.0225 0.0067 0.0058 
1954 0.0087 0.0044 0.0099 0.0225 0.0202 0.0267 0.0195 0.0180 0.0188 0.0066 0.0055 
1955 0.0093 0.0047 0.0108 0.0270 0.0204 0.0256 0.0187 0.0161 0.0253 0.0064 0.0055 
1956 0.0088 0.0046 0.0103 0.0268 0.0202 0.0279 0.0194 0.0163 0.0181 0.0067 0.0053 
1957 0.0072 0.0044 0.0096 0.0264 0.0201 0.0267 0.0201 0.0178 0.0180 0.0066 0.0050 
1958 0.0070 0.0039 0.0092 0.0207 0.0178 0.0223 0.0188 0.0169 0.0121 0.0064 0.0048 
1959 0.0077 0.0041 0.0098 0.0216 0.0182 0.0244 0.0211 0.0160 0.0165 0.0067 0.0048 
1960 0.0070 0.0041 0.0092 0.0212 0.0177 0.0239 0.0210 0.0148 0.0168 0.0067 0.0047 
1961 0.0066 0.0039 0.0089 0.0191 0.0175 0.0233 0.0212 0.0154 0.0145 0.0066 0.0048 
1962 0.0067 0.0040 0.0086 0.0189 0.0179 0.0248 0.0220 0.0162 0.0180 0.0068 0.0047 
1963 0.0072 0.0041 0.0091 0.0198 0.0184 0.0255 0.0219 0.0172 0.0204 0.0069 0.0046 ..j::::. 
1964 0.0076 0.0043 0.0093 0.0214 0.0191 0.0278 0.0215 0.0169 0.0201 0.0069 0.0046 -.....J 
1965 0.0078 0.0045 0.0090 0.0222 0.0201 0.0293 0.0234 0.0166 0.0232 0.0074 0.0046 
1966 0.0073 0.0046 0.0086 0.0227 0.0213 0.0315 0.0251 0.0188 0.0209 0.0081 0.0047 
1967 0.0070 0.0044 0.0081 0.0203 0.0215 0.0308 0.0255 0.0194 0.0177 0.0081 0.0046 
1968 0.0075 0.0044 0.0082 0.0191 0.0213 0.0297 0.0250 0.0189 0.0206 0.0081 0.0046 
1969 0.0080 0.0046 0.0086 0.0192 0.0215 0.0303 0.0250 0.0172 0.0196 0.0083 0.0047 
1970 0.0073 0.0042 0.0082 0.0181 0.0196 0.0295 0.0236 0.0150 0.0143 0.0076 0.0045 
1971 0.0075 0.0041 0.0085 0.0168 0.0189 0.0264 0.0225 0.0134 0.0196 0.0072 0.0046 
1972 0.0085 0.0045 0.0089 0.0185 0.0200 0.0286 0.0233 0.0135 0.0208 0.0075 0.0047 
1973 0.0094 0.0045 0.0094 0.0204 0.0215 0.0310 0.0251 0.0137 0.0219 0.0077 0.0047 
1974 0.0088 0.0043 0.0089 0.0245 0.0211 0.0316 0.0233 0.0132 0.0158 0.0077 0.0044 
1975 0.0068 0.0037 0.0080 0.0196 0.0197 0.0300 0.0215 0.0129 0.0155 0.0074 0.0044 
1976 0.0082 0.0039 0.0087 0.0192 0.0204 0.0305 0.0225 0.0129 0.0200 0.0077 0.0045 
1977 0.0086 0.0040 0.0086 0.0184 0.0203 0.0316 0.0232 0.0126 0.0215 0.0079 0.0044 
1978 0.0091 0.0042 0.0090 0.0197 0.0205 0.0321 0.0237 0.0131 0.0201 0.0080 0.0042 
1979 0.0090 0.0041 0.0090 0.0202 0.0210 0.0336 0.0237 0.0138 0.0171 0.0081 0.0040 
1980 0.0074 0.0039 0.0081 0.0185 0.0200 0.0337 0.0246 0.0143 0.0108 0.0086 0.0038 
1981 0.0064 0.0038 0.0076 0.0187 0.0197 0.0344 0.0247 0.0143 0.0118 0.0090 0.0043 
1982 0.0056 0.0037 0.0066 0.0120 0.0182 0.0312 0.0247 0.0150 0.0107 0.0094 0.0041 
Note: Figures may not correspond to the results derived from the preceding tables due to rounding. 
Source: Computed from data in Tables A-5 and A-6. 
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Table A-ll 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION RATES FOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
(Federal Reserve Board Series, in percent) 
Year Nondurable Goods Durable Goods 
1948 82.5 82.5 
1949 74.2 74.2 
1950 82.8 82.8 
1951 85.8 85.8 
1952 85.4 85.4 
1953 89.2 89.2 
1954 80.3 80.3 
1955 87.1 87.1 
1956 86.4 86.4 
1957 83.7 83.7 
1958 75.2 75.2 
1959 81.9 81.9 
1960 80.2 80.2 
1961 77.4 77.4 
1962 81.6 81.6 
1963 83.5 83.5 
1964 85.6 85.6 
1965 89·.6 89.6 
1966 91.1 91.1 
1967 86.8 87.1 
1968 87.1 87.2 
1969 87.0 85.9 
1970 83.9 76.5 
1971 84.0 74.6 
1972 87.4 80.7 
1973 88.1 87.2 
1974 84.7 83.1 
1975 76.6 70.3 
1976 83.0 77.1 
1977 85.0 81.1 
1978 85.6 86.0 
1979 86.3 86.7 
1980 81.8 77.8 
1981 81.1 78.2 
1982 74.8 68.2 
Note: For the period 1948 to 1966, the capacity utilization rate for total 
manufacturing is used for durable goods manufacturing industries and 
nondurable goods manufacturing industries. 
Source: Economic Report of the President, February 1984. 
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Table A-12 
REGRESSIONS ON REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY 
NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1948-1982 
Re2ressions R2 SSE DFE d A Class* £. 
A 
SIC20t = 9.60 + 0.49 t - 0.01 NCURt 0.95 16.25 31 0.44 L ( 2 4. 2 } ( -o. 2 } (2.9} 
SIC21t = 0.75 + 0.06 t - 0.003 NCURt 0.88 0.26 31 0.67 L ( 14. 1 } ( -o. 8 ) (5.4) 
SIC22t = -3.87 + 0.08 t + 0.11 NCURt 0.64 4.92 31 0.78 L (3.3} (6.8} ( 7. 4) 
SIC23t = -1.10 + 0.17 t + 0.07 NCURt 0.83 3.43 31 0.67 L (11.8) (4.7} (5.4) 
SIC26t = -4.53 + 0.27 t + 0.09 NCURt 0.89 6.05 31 0.63 L (15.5} (4.6} (4.8} 
SIC27t = -0.32 + 0.40 t + 0.05 NCURt 0.93 6.53 31 0.66 L (20.3} (2.4) (5.3) 
SIC28t = -5.08 + 0.55 t + 0.12 NCURt 0.93 11.96 31 0.67 H (20.2} (4.5} (5.4) 
SIC29t = -1.84 + 0.39 t + 0.05 NCURt 0.40 70.53 31 0.78 L (4.5} (0.8} (7.3) 
SIC30t = -5.06 + 0.25 t + 0.08 NCURt 0.87 6.05 31 0.64 L (14.0) (3.9) (4.9) 
SIC31t = 0.20 + 0.02 t + 0.02 NCURt 0.64 0.31 31 0.52 L (6.4) (4.0) (3.6) 
Note: In this and the following tables presenting regression results, the t-statistics for 
the estimated coefficients are in parenthesis. 
*Represents the classification of each industry based upon the results presented in 
Table 3. 11 L11 corresponds to a low-tech industry while 11H11 represents a high-tech 
industry. 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-5 and A-11. 
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Table A-13 
REGRESSIONS ON REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY 
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1948-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d 
,. 
E. Class 
SIC24t = -6.59 + 0.14 t + 0.13 DCURt 0.67 9.23 31 0.81 L (4.0) (7.3) (8.1) 
SIC25t = -1.59 + 0.09 t + 0.04 DCURt 0.86 0.48 31 0.83 L (10.4) (10.6) (8.9) 
SIC32t = -3.83 + 0.17 t + 0.10 DCURt 0.82 3.53 31 0.75 L ( 9. 7) (8.5) (6.7) 
SIC33t = -18.56 + 0.36 t + 0.35 DCURt 0.71 74.97 31 0.54 L (6.9) (6.5) (3.8) 
SIC34t = -9.02 + 0.50 t + 0.20 DCURt 0.88 9.38 31 0.87 L (11.1) (11.6) (10.6) 
SIC35t = -14.44 + 0.91 t + 0.28 DCURt 0.79 59.46 31 0.83 H (9.4) (6.3) ( 9. 0) 
SIC36t = -9.22 + 0.73 t + 0.18 DCURt 0.92 20.27 31 0.72 H {18.3) (6.7) (6.2) 
SIC372-9t = -2.34 + 0.39 t + 0.09 DCURt 0.76 28.96 31 0.64 H (9.9) (2.8) (4.9) 
SIC371t = -23.11 + 0.38 t + 0.38 DCURt 0.57 150.77 31 0.56 H (4.9) (4.9) (4.0) 
SIC38t = -1.90 + 0.27 t + 0.04 DCURt 0.90 2.80 31 0.76 H 
(16.5) (4.1) ( 6. 9) 
SIC39t = 0.24 + 0.08 t + 0.03 DCURt 0.74 0.97 31 0.72 L (8.9} (4.6} (6.1} 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-6 and A-11. 
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Table A-14 
REGRESSIONS ON REAL NATIONAL INC0~1E PRODUCED BY 
NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1970-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d ... £. Class 
SIC20t = 9.02 + 0.56 t - 0.02 NCURt 0.86 9. 51 10 1. 78 L (6.8) (-0.2) 
SIC21t = -1.02 + 0.09 t + 0.01 NCURt 0.83 0.12 9 0.4 7 L ( 6. 3) (0.7) ( 1. 9) 
SIC22t = -10.58 + 0.10 t + 0.19 NCURt 0.93 0.42 9 0.59 L (3.3) (10.6) (2.6) 
SIC23t = -5.74 + 0.11 t + 0.15 NCURt 0.85 0.61 10 1.94 L (5.5) (7.0) 
SIC26t = -18.41 + 0.39 t + 0.22 NCURt 0.89 1.35 9 0.54 L (7.5) (6.6) (2.3) 
SIC27t = -13.36 + 0.54 t + 0.16 NCURt 
(14.6) (4.4) 
0.96 1. 90 10 2.18 L 
SIC28t = -18.44 + 0.70 t + 0.23 NCURt 0.84 5.47 9· 0.53 H 
-( 6. 7) (3.5) (2.3) 
SIC29t = -33.04 + 1.31 t + 0.12 NCURt 0.87 36.45 9 0.12 L ( 7.1) (0.7) (0.4) 
SIC30t = -17.48 + 0.36 t + 0.19 NCURt 0.93 1.47 10 2.21 L 
( 11.1) (5.9) 
SIC31t = 0.58 + 0.01 t + 0.02 NCURt 0.22 0.14 10 1. 72 L 
(1.3 ( 1. 5) 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-5 and A-11. 
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Table A-15 
REGRESSIONS ON REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED BY 
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1970-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d " E. Class 
SIC24t = -13.02 + 0.15 t + 0.22 DCURt 0.88 2.57 9 0.28 L (3.0} (8.0} ( 1. 0} 
SIC25t = -2.11 + 0.09 t + 0.05 DCURt 0.94 0.11 9 0.25 L (8.6) (9.0} (0.9) 
SIC32t = -7.54 + 0.17 t + 0.15 DCURt 0.90 1.21 9 0.25 L (5.0) (8.1} (0.9) 
SIC33t = -25.34 + 0.35 t + 0.45 DCURt 0.65 47.31 9 0.25 L 
(1. 7} (3.9} {0.9) 
SIC34t = -15.26 + 0.60 t + 0.26 DCURt 0.96 2.20 9 0.26 L (13.0} (10.3} { 1.0} 
SIC35t = -34.40 + 1.48 t + 0.34 DCURt 
(15.8) (5.5) 0.96 15.90 10 
1.65 H 
SIC36t = -15.09 + 0.88 t + 0.20 DCURt 0.89 8.56 9 0.42 H {8.2} (4.1) { 1. 7) 
SIC372-9t = -1.90 + 0.46 t + 0.05 DCURt 0.75 5.11 9 0.49 H (5.1} (1.3} {2.0) 
SIC371t = -16.80 + 0.01 t + 0.44 DCURt 0.42 103.31 9 0.34 H (0.04} (2.5} { 1. 3) 
SIC38t = -5.45 + 0.41 t + 0.03 DCURt 0.92 0.96 9 0.50 H (10.4} (2.1} (2.1) 
SIC39t = 0.74 + 0.08 t + 0.02 DCURt 0.77 0.36 10 1.91 L (5.4} (2.5} 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-6 and A-11. 
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Table A-16 
REGRESSIONS ON FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES IN 
NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1948-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d " Class E. 
SIC20t = 1,495.08 - 4.80 t + 3.16 NCURt 0.58 11,041 31 0. 74 L (-4.9) (4.0) (6.6) 
SIC21t = 93.38 - 1.15 t + 0.12 NCURt 0.94 171 31 0.30 L 
(-21.3) (1.2) ( 1. 9) 
SIC22t = 455.67 - 13.33 t + 9.04 NCURt 0.75 30,174 31 0.84 L (-5.9) ( 7.1) (9.3) 
SIC23t = 455.96 + 1.47 t + 8.73 NCURt 0.63 25,307 31 0.69 L 
( 1.1) (7.2) (5.6) 
SIC26t = 209.41 + 6.54 t + 3.39 NCURt 0.78 6,033 31 0. 74 L 
( 9. 0) (5.8) (6.6) 
SIC27t = 578.33 + 13.09 t + 1.35 NCURt 0.86 9,348 31 0.76 L 
(13.9) ( 1. 9) (6.9) 
SIC28t = 350.19 + 14.40 t + 3.42 NCURt o. 91 12,684 31 0.65 H 
(17.3) (3.9) (5.0) 
SIC29t = 183.66 - 0.85 t + 0.42 NCURt 0.18 1,034 31 0.88 L 
(-1.8) (1.8) (10.9) 
SIC30t = -213.75 + 13.33 t + 5.93 NCURt 0.85 16,312 31 o. 71 L (12.2) (6.1) (6.0) 
SIC31t = 246.49 - 5.27 t + 1.92 NCURt 0.83 1,985 31 0.81 L 
(-10.3) (5.9) ( 8. 2) 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-7 and A-11. 
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Table A-17 
REGRESSIONS ON FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES IN 
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1948-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d ... E. Class 
A 
SIC24t = 220.35 - 4.30 t + 6.78 DCURt 0.69 24,021 31 0.81 L 
(-2.4) (7.5) ( 8. 2) 
SIC25t = -15.89 + 4.53 t + 4.11 DCURt 0.87 2,853 31 0.81 L ( 7. 4) (13.1) (8.0) 
SIC32t = 169.89 + 3.64 t + 4.56 DCURt 0.81 5,568 31 0.56 L (7.7) (9.8) (4.0) 
SIC33t = 148.30 - 1.13 t + 12.87 DCURt 0.70 62,381 31 0.55 L ( -o. 7 ) ( 8. 3 ) (3.9) 
SIC34t = -8.35 + 16.42 t + 13.35 DCURt 0.82 47,037 31 0.78 L {7.2) (10.4) ( 7. 4) 
SIC35t = 9.80 + 34.16 t + 14.57 DCURt 0.74 233,167 31 0.69 H 
(8.7) (5.0) (5.6) 
SIC36t = -285.07 + 35.86 t + 15.24 DCURt 0.86 125,517 31 0.68 H 
(12.6) (7.1) (5.5) 
SIC372-9t = 117.10 + 12.44 t + 7.53 DCURt 0.26 285,412 31 o. 71 H 
(2. 7) (2.3) (5.9) 
SIC371t = -286.46 + 4.60 t + 12.38 DCURt o. 74 50,450 31 0.80 H 
(1.9) (9.4) ( 7. 8) 
SIC38t = 36.71 + 12.99 t + 2.66 DCURt 0.85 10,000 31 0.76 H 
(13.1) (4.5) ( 7. 0) 
SIC39t = 176.56 + 0.45 t + 2.66 DCURt 0.76 2,063 31 0.78 L 
(0.9) (9.9) ( 7. 3) 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-8 and A-11. 
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Table A-18 
REGRESSIONS ON FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES IN 
NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1970-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d A E. 
SIC20t = 1,410.85 - 5.77 t + 4.66 NCURt 0.69 3,761 9 0.47 
( -2.2) (2.7) ( 1. 9) 
SIC21t = 102.44 - 1.04 t - 0.03 NCURt (-5.8) (-0.2) 0.81 45 10 1.65 
SIC22t = 207.11 - 11.28 t + 11.90 NCURt 0.96 2,080 9 0.45 
( -6.1) (9.1) ( 1.8) 
SIC23t* = 338.10 - 6.18 t + 12.90 NCURt 0.98 1,694 9 -0.35 ( -6.7) (12.5) (-1.3) 
SIC26t = 245.24 + 1.50 t + 4.67 NCURt 0.69 1,396 9 0.13 ( 1. 3) (4.4) (0.5) 
SIC27t = 420.93 + 15.29 t + 2.50 NCURt 0.65 7,010 9 0.54 (4.1) (1.1) (2.3) 
SIC28t = 468.29 + 11.73 t + 2.93 NCURt 0.73 4,505 9 0.31 
(4.9) ( 1.5) ( 1. 2) 
SIC29t = 62.15 + 2.21 t + 0.84 NCURt 0.73 236 9 0.04 (5.0) (1.9) (0.2) 
SIC30t = -736.10 + 15.72 t + 11.63 NCURt 0.93 3,000 10 1. 70 
(10.8) (8.0) 
SIC31t = 262.37 - 5.94 t + 1.90 NCURt 0.93 604 9 0.12 (-7.9) (2.7) (0.4) 
*For this industry the null hypothesis of no negative first-order autocorrelation was 
rejected at a 5% level of significance. Hence, the equation was corrected for 
negative autocorrelation instead of positive autocorrelation. 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-7 and A-11. 
Class 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
H 
L 
L 
L 
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Table A-19 
REGRESSIONS ON FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES IN 
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 
1970-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d A Class £. 
SIC24t = 140.68 - 3.60 t + 8.01 DCURt 0.90 3,057 9 0.25 L (-2.1) (8.5) (0.9) 
SIC25t = 31.19 + 1.54 t + 4.71 DCURt 0.95 429 9 0.31 L (2.3} (13.4} ( 1.2) 
SIC32t = 214.90 - 0.63 t + 5.66 DCURt 0.89 1,575 9 0.23 L ( -0.5) (8.4} (0.9) 
SIC33t = 584.15 - 12.67 t + 11.80 DCURt 0.84 16,379 9 0.19 L (-3.4) (5.5) (0.7) 
SIC34t = 383.56 + 4.24 t + 13.09 DCURt 0.87 9,890 9 0.19 L ( 1. 5} ( 7. 8} ( o. 7) 
SIC35t = -357.83 + 49.46 t + 14.23 DCURt 0.82 85,265 9 0.16 H (6.0} {2.9) (0.6} 
SIC36t = 119.02 + 26.39 t + 13.32 DCURt 0.67 56,312 9 0.41 H (3.1) (3.3) ( 1. 6) 
SIC372-9t = 478.82 + 9.99 t + 2.88 DCURt 0.26 30,669 9 0.38 H (1.6) (1.0) ( 1. 5) 
SIC371t = -131.00 - 1.54 t + 13.10 DCURt 0.83 13,747 9 0.37 H 
(-0.4) (6.6} ( 1. 4} 
SIC38t = -105.14 + 18.95 t + 2.24 DCURt 0.90 4,284 9 0.32 H (8.8) (2.0) ( 1.2) 
SIC39t = 240.67 - 1.76 t + 2.76 DCURt 0.93 243 9 0.49 L ( -2.8) (10.5} (2.0) 
Sources: Computed from data in Tables A-8 and A-11. 
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Table A-20 
REGRESSIONS ON THE RATIO OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED 
BY NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
TO REAL NATIONAL INCOME, 
1948-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d A Class 
..e. 
SIC20t = 0.02359 - 0.00008 t 0.32 2.4E-5 32 0.35 L (-3.9) (2.2) 
SIC21t = 0.00148 + 0.00002 t 0.30 4.8E-7 32 0.63 L (3.7) (4.8) 
SIC22t = 0.01268 - 0.00020 t 0.50 1.9E-5 32 0.70 L ( -5.6) (5.8) 
SIC23t = 0.01100 - 0.00009 t 0.42 2.7E-6 32 0.81 L 
( -4.8) (8.1) 
SIC26t = 0.00804 + 0.00006 t 0.56 6.2E-6 32 0.26 L (6.4) ( 1. 6) 
SIC27t = 0.01096 + 0.00010 t 0.68 5.1E-6 32 0.51 L ( 8. 3) (3.5) 
SIC28t = 0.01448 + 0.00016 t 0.61 1. 7E-5 32 0.52 H (7.1) (3.6) 
SIC29t = 0.00933 + 0.00009 t 0.03 6.1E-5 32 0.83 L 
( 1. 0) (8.7) 
SIC30t = 0.00446 + 0.00011 t 0.78 5.3E-6 32 0.38 L 
(10.7) (2.4) 
SIC31t = 0.00376 - 0.00006 t 0.89 4.3E-7 32 0.52 L (-16.3) (3.6) 
Source: Computed from data in Table A-9. 
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Table A-21 
REGRESSIONS ON THE RATIO OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED 
BY DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
TO REAL NATIONAL INCOME, 
1948-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d A Class 
.e.. 
SIC24t = 0.01026 - 0.00011 t 0.21 2.6E-5 32 0.67 L {-3.0) (5.3) 
SIC25t = 0.00484 - 0.00003 t 0.29 1.5E-6 32 0.60 L ( -3.6) ( 4. 5) 
SIC32t = 0.01025 - 0.00007 t 0.48 8.0E-6 32 0.40 L { -5.5) (2.6} 
SIC33t = 0.02625 - 0.00028 t 0.47 1.8E-4 32 0.28 L { -5.4) ( 1. 7) 
SIC34t = 0.02003 - 0.00001 t 0.002 3.3E-5 32 0.62 L { -0.2) (4.6) 
SIC35t = 0.02572 + 0.00018 t 0.15 1.2E-4 32 0.63 H (2.4) (4.8) 
SIC36t = 0.01839 + 0.00020 t 0.38 3.9E-5 32 0.66 H {4.4) (5.2) 
SIC372-9t = 0.01265 + 0.00010 t 0.03 7.2E-5 32 0.81 H ( 1. 0} (3.1} 
SIC371t = 0.02088 - 0.00015 t 0.10 3. 2E-4 32 0.37 H (-1.9) (2.3) 
SIC38t = 0.00533 + 0.00011 t 0.60 3.1E-6 32 0.72 H ( 7. 0) (6.2) 
SIC39t = 0.00612 - 0.00007 t 0.61 2.0E-6 32 0.62 L {-7.1) (4.6) 
Source: Computed from data in Table A-10. 
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Table A-22 
REGRESSIONS ON THE RATIO OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED 
BY NONDURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
TO REAL NATIONAL INCOME, 
1970-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE A d E.. Class 
SIC20t = 0.02352 - 0.00008 t 0.07 1.4E-5 11 1.63 L (-0.9) 
SIC21t = 0.00112 + 0.00003 t 0.45 9.8E-8 10 0.37 L {2.9) ( 1.4) 
SIC22t = 0.01356 - 0.00021 t 0.80 2.0E-6 11 1.57 L ( -6.7) 
SIC23t = 0.01467 - 0.00021 t (-10.3) o. 91 8.2E-7 11 1.50 L 
SIC26t = 0.00976 - 0.0000006 t o.oo 3.2E-6 10 0.25 L 
< -o. 01) ( o. 9) 
SIC27t = 0.01280 + 0.00003 t 0.11 1. 7E-6 11 1.43 L ( 1.2) 
SIC28t = 0.01800 + 0.00003 t 0.01 4.6E-6 10 0.56 H (0.3) (2.4) 
SIC29t = -0.01140 + 0.00084 t 0.82 2.9E-5 11 1.60 L {7.0) 
SIC30t = 0.00656 + 0.00004 t 0.05 3.0E-6 10 0.23 L {0.7) ( o. 9) 
SIC31t = 0.00360 - 0.00006 t ( -6.0) 0.76 l.SE-7 11 1.42 L 
Source: Computed from data in Table A-9. 
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Table A-23 
REGRESSIONS ON THE RATIO OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED 
BY DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
TO REAL NATIONAL INCOME, 
1970-1982 
Regressions R2 SSE DFE d ... Class £. 
SIC24t = 0.01094 - 0.00011 t 0.09 1.1E-5 10 0.41 L ( -1.0} ( 1. 6} 
SIC25t = 0.00530 - 0.00004 t 
(-2.7) 0.41 5.2E-7 11 1.37 L 
SIC32t = 0.01128 - 0.00010 t 0.22 3.9E-6 10 0.35 L (-1.7) ( 1. 3) 
SIC33t = 0.02544 - 0.00024 t 0.09 7.7E-5 10 0.19 L (-1.0) (0.7) 
SIC34t = 0.02138 - 0.00005 t 0.03 8.3E-6 10 0.30 L ( -o. 6) ( 1.1) 
SIC35t = 0.01863 + 0.00046 t 0.62 2.2E-5 11 1. 77 H (4.3} 
SIC36t = 0.02032 + 0.00012 t 0.19 1. OE-5 11 1.35 H ( 1. 6} 
SIC372-9t = 0.01295 + 0.00003 t 0.02 5.1E-6 10 0.42 H (0.4} ( 1. 6) 
SIC37lt = 0.03050 - 0.00050 t 0.17 1.2E-4 10 0.36 H ( -1.4) ( 1. 4) 
SIC38t = 0.00393 + 0.00015 t 0.68 8.6E-7 10 0.41 H (4.6) ( 1. 6) 
SIC39t = 0.00589 - 0.00005 t 0.63 3.2E-7 11 1.65 L ( -4.3) 
Source: Computed from data in Table A-10. 
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Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Standard 
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Printing Office, 1972). 
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index for durable goods is used for industries in that category and the 
nondurable goods index is used if the industry is classified as 
nondurable. 
4. For a detailed discussion of the econometric methods used throughout this 
paper, see the section on methodology in the Appendix. 
5. Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles and Unemployment (New York: National 
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Correlation with Extreme Sample Sizes or Many Regressors," Econometrica, 
November 1977, pp. 1989-1996. 
18. For a detailed explanation of this procedure see, SAS Institute, Inc., 
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